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Dennis R. Henderso~/ 
I was asked to address the impacts of governmental regulation on 
cooperatives. But, that is a big area to cover, so I have narrowed 
things down a bit. As a marketing economist whose government experience 
has been primarily at the Federal level, I will concentrate on Federal 
market regulations. I will ignore the morass of other Federal, state 
and local regulations--labor, environmental, health, safety, taxation, 
zoning and land use just to mention a few--which affect agricultural 
cooperatives in numerous ways. Thus, I've recognized my omissions. 
But I do not apologize, for my emphasis is on what I know best. 
My plan is this: I will first review the rationale for Federal 
market regulation. Then, identify how and why this rationale is changing 
in today's regulatory environment. Finally, I will discuss the implica-
tions of these changes, as I see them, for cooperatives. 
Rationale For Market Regulation 
The classic argument for Federal intervention in the marketplace 
goes something like this: A private, free enterprise society such as the 
United States ~ maintain a viable, general market system as a means of 
organizing and coordinating the myriad of decentralized economic decisions. 
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Furthermore, it is necessary to maintain competition in order for the 
market system to provide economic discipline for society as an alterna-
tive to direct control by Government or private cartel. It order to 
maintain competition, it is appropriate for the Federal government to 
create as nearly as possible those conditions necessary for competition 
in the marketplace. 
This line of reasoning has resulted in several Government programs 
aimed at improving competition in agricultural markets. Examples include: 
(l) Federal-state market news, aimed at improving knowledge of marketing 
opportunities and increasing competitive interaction, (2) product grades 
and standards and fair labeling and packaging rules, aimed at reducing 
product differences which encumber competition, and (3) anti-trust laws 
designed to prevent collusion among market participants. 
However, closer examination of many regulatory programs suggests 
that their primary purpose rests not in improving competition, but rather 
in making the lack of competition more acceptable. By this I mean that 
much market regulation is designed more to prescribe certain outcomes, 
or at least to prevent particularly undesirable market results, rather 
than to create conditions conducive to competitive self-discipline. 
Let's look at some specific examples. While the Packers and Stock-
yards Act does include language designed to prohibit collusion among 
buyers, most of its provisions deal with trade practices, that is, 
provisions which prohibit or prescribe certain practices such as restraining 
trade, deception, and bonding. The intent of the Agricultural Fair 
Practices Act was to prevent discrimination against colluding sellers. 
The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act prescribes payment behavior 
for large, dominant buyers. And the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
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Act declares numerous trading acts to be fraudulent and criminal 
rather than non-competitive. 
Clearly, the Capper-Volstead Act and other policies which facilitate 
collective action in agricultural markets are not fully consonant with 
the "enhance competition" rationale. Rather, they are based upon the 
principle of giving certain groups more influence over the outcome of 
the marketing process than they would otherwise have. That is, making 
the outcome of the marketing process more acceptable. 
Marketing orders provide perhaps the best example. These have, 
in large, been instituted not because competition has been absent, but 
because performance was considered unacceptable--unacceptable from the 
viewpoint of one or more groups with enough political power to bring 
about a political solution to their perceived economic problem. Disorderly 
marketing, meaning highly uncertain supplies and prices, has been one 
major economic problem leading to market order regulations. These 
regulations control the flow of products to various markets and administer 
the pricing process. As such, they have helped make performance more 
acceptable. But they certainly have not perfected competition. 
This is not to suggest that producers have realized all of their 
aspirations with market order regulations. To the contrary, accomplishments 
are usually well short of their desires. In most order situations, 
producers' have wanted both more stability and higher prices. Stability 
has also been sought by other groups in the marketplace--namely, handlers 
and consumers--and has been more readily achieved than have higher prices, 
which have less widespread political support. 
One theme clearly emerges from this brief analysis. As the rationale 
for Government intervention in markets changes from an emphasis on 
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encouraging competition to predetermining at least some aspects of the 
outcome of the marketing process, the economic consequences for participants 
increasingly becomes a function of their political influence. The oft-
quoted adage that politics and economics are forever bedfellows takes on 
renewed importance. This demands focusing our attention upon the 
environment within which Federal regulatory decisions are being made. 
Current Regulatory Environment 
Despite much rhetoric from the Carter administration favoring 
deregulation in the marketplace, with the possible exception of the 
airline industry there is little evidence of movement toward less govern-
mental intervention. Actually, just the opposite appears to be more 
likely. Proposed trade regulations to require labels on protein supple-
ments stating that the stuff is unnecessary, to eliminate resale margins 
on some products offered by funeral directors, and to mandate money-back 
guarantees on hearing aids, renewed interest in international commodity 
agreements, and blind commitment to Federal price controls on oil and 
gas, are random examples. 
How is agricultural marketing policy being affected? Market orders 
are again illustrative. As we all know, these have been increasingly 
attacked in recent years for their anti-competitive impacts. The new 
solution~ however, does not go at the question of competition; rather, 
it is to add new actors--public and consumer representatives. U.S.D.A. 
policy is now to add provisions for public representatives to each market 
order that comes up for modification. Procedures are being refined to 
assure that such public representatives are "bona fide" consumer representa-
tives, however that is defined. Further, the Department is developing 
procedures to broaden the input from people outside the industry into the 
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formal hearings on market order modification. Thus, Federal regulation 
in these instances is expanding, rather than contracting, by putting 
more people into the regulatory process who reflect different ideas on 
what constitutes acceptable market performance. 
Other changes further support this premise. The Agricultural 
.Harketing Service, in charge of running much of the Department's market 
regulatory programs, has hired a public relations specialist to facilitate 
"public" input into the Agency's decisionmaking process. Producer-
financed check-off programs for market development provide another example. 
U.S.D.A. is diligently at work developing uniform oversight procedures 
to assure that such producer-supplied funds are used in an acceptable 
manner. It is not yet clear what is acceptable--nutritional research and 
education appear likely criteria--but it is clear that the producers who 
foot the bill will have some company in determining how it is spent. 
On the nutrition front, the school lunch program provides another 
illustration. The Food and Nutrition Service, which oversees that program, 
has promulgated a rule banning nutritionally-fortified snack foods in 
school lunches. In this case, the consumers (school kids) didn't exercise 
much influence--they seemed to like the product--but the overseers felt 
it was bad for the consumers' teeth. Here, the opinion of the regulator 
on what is acceptable was the key. The Federal Trade Commission applied 
roughly the same logic when proposing a ban on television advertising of 
sugar-coated breakfast cereals. And the Food and Drug Administration 
recently refused to modify ice cream standards because the Administrator 
was "politically convinced" that consumers would not like the taste of 
products which might be sold under the proposed revisions. 
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The list of examples can be extended ad nauseum. But the point 
is made. Federal regulation in agricultural markets is increasingly 
being based upon the rationale of creating acceptable market performance, 
and new actors are getting into the process who have perceptions of 
what is acceptable which may differ widely from what would be judged 
acceptable in the collective judgment of a competitive marketplace. 
There are several explanations which can be put forward for this 
shifting orientation by Federal regulators. Some, such as structural 
change and the rapid pace of specialization and personal interdependency 
have long been recognized. However, there are a couple of factors which 
have received less attention--the nature of the Federal bureaucracy and 
what I call the "regulator mentality." Let's take a closer look. 
First, to the bureaucracy. Firing hostile broadsides at the Federal 
bureaucracy appears to be in vogue. In this regard, perhaps I'm just in 
tune with the times. But, I believe that this is a major factor, abetted 
by an increasing amount of parochialism in Congress, influencing Federal 
intervention in agricultural markets. 
One of my first observations when I went to Washington last year 
was the domination of the Office of Management and Budget over the policies 
of the Department of Agriculture, as well as other Federal agencies. 
To understand why, it is instructive to look at the evolution of OMB. 
Management was added to the budget office under the Nixon-Ash plan to 
centralize decisionmaking at the White House. OMB, armed with rules 
and procedures for funnelling virtually all policy decisions to the 
President through that agency, became the primary vehicle for implementing 
central control. The important point is that OMB was created to be a 
bureau of control, the mechanism for bringing about Nixon's "New Federalism." 
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Now we have a Chief Executive who espouses decentralization, who 
apparently has no "New Federalism" or "Great Society" or "New Frontier" 
or "Fair Deal" or whatever. The rhetoric is, let decisionmaking rest 
with the Departmen~and agencies, with those persons most knowledgeable 
in a particular area. Yet, OMB, the central control bureau, is alive 
and as pervasive as ever. Thus, we now have a control mechanism with 
no one in control. OMB has the authority to coordinate Administration 
policy, but little policy direction has emerged from the White House. 
As a result, OMB exercises its authority by subjecting each Department's 
policy proposals to review by just about any other agency who might be 
even remotely interested. 
This has substantially increased the number of people which influence 
agricultural policy. Not that other agencies can necessarily cause 
outright rejection of a USDA proposal, but they often can prevent 
implementation without modification. One example. Agricultural price 
support policy, once decided largely by the USDA in conjunction with 
Treasury, now is routinely discussed by State, Commerce, Justice, Labor, 
the Domestic Council, Council of Economic Advisors, and the Council on 
Wage and Price Stability, coordinated of course by OMB. Another example, 
which hits close to home. Four outside agencies are now active partners 
in the determination of Federal policy toward cooperative marketing in 
agriculture--the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, the 
Council of Economic Advisors and the Council on Wage and Price Stability. 
None of these agencies is knoWlfor its pro-cooperative point of view. 
Superimposed on this bureaucratic mosaic is the growth of a parochial 
Congress. While our representatives on Capitol Hill hav~long recognized 
that in the end its the folks back home who count, I perceive a notable 
-8-
decline in recent years in the numbers who maintain a national perspective. 
More are putting greater emphasis on the vested interests of their 
particular constituency. This substantially increases the number of 
views on what is acceptable. Because Congress is the source of the 
lifeblood of the bureaucracy, money, it is not surprising that the 
bureaucrats respond quickly to this proliferation of congressional 
opinion. 
Next, the regulatory mind set. I detect two interesting trends 
here--(1) people who have sharply different perspectives and who are 
associated with widely varying interest groups are now in positions of 
power and (2) these individuals reflect the view that individual 
judgment is often better than the collective judgment of the marketplace. 
A couple of examples from USDA. The most obvious is the appointment 
of Mrs. Foreman as Assistant Secretary. As a consumer advocate, she 
brings a substantially different point of view to the top policy level 
of the Department. To illustrate: prior to her appointment, she had 
staged a physical disruption of a USDA advisory committee meeting, 
protesting the insufficient "public" representation provided by one 
bona-fide consumer advocate on that committee. Clearly, consumer interests 
at the Department are now in more effective hands. Another example is the 
appointment of Barbara Schlei as Administrator of AMS. Her background 
is largely in equal employment opportunity and sex discrimination. 
Thus, another new perspective enters into the decisionmaking hierarchy, 
another set of views on what constitutes acceptable performance in 
agricultural markets. 
These appointments of people with diverse interests correspond with 
a general growth in the view that the market should have a declining 
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role in a society of abundance. Combined, these are having the effect 
of reducing resistance in the Government community to more rapid 
substitution of the "acceptable performance" criterion for the "enhanced 
competition" criterion in matters of market regulation. 
Implications For Cooperatives 
How are these changes in the Federal decision-making process and 
in the justification or rationalization for Federal intervention in 
agricultural markets affecting farmer cooperatives? Clearly, people 
with interests in other than the agricultural community are influencing, 
if not outright controlling, Federal regulatory decisiomwhich impact 
directly on cooperatives. Both the Justice Department and the Federal 
Trade Commission have viciously attacked the anti-trust immunity provided 
to farmers under the Capper-Volstead Act, along with Federal market orders 
and other Federal marketing policy. They argue that there is no evidence 
of a market power imbalance between farmers and others in the agricultural 
marketing system, and even point to the existence of a few large cooperatives 
such as Associated Milk Producers and Farmland Industries as evidence to 
the contrary. Further, they argue that, even if such an imbalance exists, 
it is not clear that a redress is in the public interest. 
Some would dismiss these arguments, particularly as the inaccuracies 
contained in last year's Justice Department attack on the milk marketing 
system have come to light. And granted, it is hard to get too uptight 
when their calculations show the net annual social loss associated with 
monopolization by dairy cooperatives to be less than 50 cents per person. 
But, the critics have come back full force. Last December, President Carter 
chartered the National Commission for the Review of Anti-trust Laws and 
Procedures and charged it with making recommendations on "the desirability 
of retaining the various exemptions and immunities from the anti-trust laws." 
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The Commission reportedly has a strong interest in agriculture in general 
and the Capper-Volstead Act specifically. The FTC and Justice are both 
well represented on the Commission, along with prominent U.S. Senators 
and Congressmen such as Kennedy, Javits, Metzenbaum, Rodino, and 
Seiberling, none of whom would be members of a congressional co-op 
caucus, if indeed there was one. 
Even within the Department of Agriculture, the critic's voice can 
be heard with increasing clarity. Secretary Berglund recently announced 
his intent to "monitor the activities of cooperatives in order to be 
constantly alert to any possible undue price enhancement ... " With formal 
procedures being established to assure more than a modicum of input by 
consumers and other public interest groups into the Department's decision-
making process, this new attention to Section 2 provisions of Capper-Volstead 
bears close watching. Proposed legislation to replace the largely-
ineffective Agricultural Fair Practices Act would give the Secretary of 
Agriculture an even larger role in overseeing the operations and market 
behavior of those cooperatives which qualify for protection. 
Furthermore, Departmental bureaucrats themselves are often notably 
hostile toward cooperatives. Much internal resistance to the recent USDA 
reorganization which folded the old Farmer Cooperative Service into a 
new, larger agency came from peopleinother parts of the merged agency 
who feared that they would now be viewed as proponents of cooperatives, 
God forbid. 
Where does all of this point for today's--and tomorrow's--cooperative? 
Let me highlight just three points. First, I believe that the opponents 
of cooperative marketing in agriculture will continue their barrage on 
the legal foundations of farmer cooperatives until some change occurs. 
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I can't predict when this will haopen,nor the nature of change. But, 
there simply are too many critics, too many people becoming increasingly 
entrenched in positions of influence, too many people who believe that 
their judgment is superior to the judgment of the marketplace, to reach 
any other conclusion. 
Second, cooperatives and other farm organizations must work together, 
politically, with new vigor. Your organizations are representatives of 
the farming community; potentially its most important representatives in 
the policy process. But, I detect a trend toward less unity and greater 
specialization and parochialism among cooperatives and other farm 
organizations. This means more, rather than more unanimous, points of 
view on what is acceptable to farmers. Many non-farm interest groups 
already claim that they don't have to pay much attention to what farmers 
want because different farm groups express such divergent and often 
conflicting viewpoints that obviously, farmers themselves don't know 
what they want. 
Third, cooperatives must prepare to take the legal initiative necessary 
to litigate and appeal regulatory decisions evolving out of today's 
legislative-regulatory environment. There can be no doubt but what there 
will be an increasing number of disputes between those who regulate and 
those who are regulated. This is a logical outcome of any process which 
increases the number of opinions and viewpoints held by policy makers 
and regulators. As farmers and other agricultural interest groups continue 
to lose a dominant voice in the policy and regulatory process, they 
will have little alternative but to turn to the courts and the legal system 
as a means of seeking recognition of their points of view and adjudication 
of their disputes with others involved in regulatory policy. 
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Unfortunately, I believe that we in the agricultural community are 
woefully ill-prepared to make this use of our legal system. Anti-
trust law provides a good example. We have argued, successfully for 
the most part, that the Capper-Volstead Act gives the right to make 
monopolization and restraint of trade charges against cooperatives 
exclusively to the Secretary of Agriculture. As we know, in the 56 
year history of that law, no Secretary of Agriculture has brought such 
charges. This means, in tur~ that no body of case law has yet been 
developed and tested which serves as a boundary around the anti-trust 
immunity for agricultural cooperatives. But, the FTC and Justice are 
going to persist, and greater anti-trust action by these agencies 
directed toward cooperatives is sure to follow. It is going to be a 
lengthly, complex, and expensive legal task for cooperatives to develop 
that missing case law under these conditions. And it will be an even 
more arduous task to guide that evolving case law in a direction which 
does not seriously damage the cooperative marketing system. 
The challenge is clear. Farmer cooperatives, which were born out 
of political activitism in the early 1920's, must enlarge their arena 
of political activitism and extent it to legal activism, if the voice of 
the farmer is going to be heard in our emerging regulatory government. 
